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This is the second of a two-part article on polygraph evidence.
The first part examined scientific issues and procedures. This article
focuses on legal issues.
The admissibility of polygraph ev
idence was first considered and re
jected in Frye v. United States, 1 the
1923 case in which the D.C. Circuit
established the general acceptance
test for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.2 According to the court,
the polygraph3 had not gained general
acceptance in the fields of psychology
a.TJd physiology.4 From F1ye until the
1970s, polygraph evidence was over
whelmingly rejected by the courts.5

l.n the early 1970s several trial
courts departed from nearly fifty
years of precedent and admitted the
results of unstipulated polygraph ex
aminations. fu ·United States v.
Ridling, 6 a federal district court found
that ''the theory of the polygraph is
sound" and "directly relevant" to
the issue (i.e., perjury) being liti
gated� 7 The court \vent on to h old that
the results of a polygraph exa.l11ina
tion conducted by a court-appointed
expert would be admissible under
certai.-1 conditions. 3Polygraph results
were also admitted in United States
v. Zeiger.9 The Zeiger court held that
the ''polygraph has been accepted

Albert 1. Weaiherhead ill & Richard
W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University. This col
umn is based in part on P. Giannelli &
E. Imwinlcelried, Scielltific Evidence (2d
ed. 1993). Reprinted by permission.
·

I

by authorities in the field as being
capable of producing highly proba
tive evidence in a court of law when

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

2

The Frye case was overruled by ihe
U.S. Supreme Court in 1993. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993). Dauben, however,
appiies only to federal trials and did not
involve polygraph evidence.

exclusion. That case, however, was soon
undercut by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y.
204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938),
which reaffirmed the New York Court of
Appeals' earlier position excluding the
results of polygraph examinations.

3 The instrument used in Frye mea
sured oDJy one physiological response
(i.e., blood pressure), whereas the mod
em polygraph measures respiration and
galvanic skin resistance in addition to
blood pressure. The technique also has
been improved through the development
of control questions, the pretest inter
view, and stimulation methods.

6

7 Id. at 95.
3 Admissibility was conditioned on the
selection of a court-appointed expert and
the expert's determination that the results
indicated either truth or deception. If the
appointed expert testified, the defen
dant's own expert would also be permit
ted to testify. !d. at 99.

4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5

350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).

9 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd,
475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).

People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 5 4
3 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
is an exception to the general rule of
,

366

FORENSIC SCIENCE
properly used by competent, experi
enced examiners. "10 fu addition, in
People v. Cutter11 a California court
admitted polygraph evidence during
a suppression hearing after fmding
that the ''polygraph now enjoys gen
eral acceptance among authorities,
including psychologists and re
searchers . . . as well as polygraph
examiners. "12 Several other courts
also admitted polygraph evidence at
this time. 13
The trend in favor of admissibility
that these cases seemed to forecast
never developed. Zeiger was re
versed per curiam, 14 while Ridling
and Cutter were never appealed, thus
precluding the opportunity for appel
late approval. Nevertheless, the judi
cial approach to polygraph evidence
seems to have been altered by these
decisions and the attention that they
received in the literature.15 In particu
lar, a number of courts admitted poly
graph results upon stipulation after
these decisions were rendered.
10 Jd. at 690.

Per Se Exclusion
A majority of jurisdictions follow
the traditional rule, holding poly
graph evidence inadmissible per se.
This category includes both federal16
and state courts.17 fu addition, the

16 E.g.,United States v. A&S Council
Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1 128, 1 133- 1 134 (4th
Cir. 199 1 ) ; United States v. Hunter, 672
F.2d 8 15, 8 1 7 (lOth Cir. 1982); United
States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1 050, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1 974); Mil. R. Evid. 707.
See also Annotation, "Modem Status
of Rule Relating to Admission of Results
of Lie Detector(Polygraph) Test in Fed
eral Criminal Trials," 43 A.L.R. Fed.
68 (1979).
17
E.g., People v. Anderson,637 P.2d
354, 358 (Colo. 198 1 ) ; State v. Miller,
202 Conn. 463,486,522 A.2d 249,260261 (1987); People v. Baynes, 88 ill.
2d 225, 244, 430 N.E.2d 1 070, 1079
(1981); Harris v. State, 481 N.E.2d 382,
384 (Ind. 1 985); Ice v. Commonwealth,
667 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Ky. 1984); State
v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La.
1979); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich.
352,359,255 N.W.2d 171, 1 73 (1977);
State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79
(Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1 14 1 ( 1 986); Pennington v. State, 437
So. 2d 37,40(Miss. 1983); State v. Staat,
8 1 1 P.2d 126 1 , 1263 (Mont. 1991); State
v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 1 82, 1 85 (Mo.
1980); State v. Grier,307 N.C. 628,645,
300 S.E.2d 35 1 ,361 ( 1 983); Birdsong v.
State, 649 P.2d 786, 788 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1982); State v. Lyon,304 Or. 221 ,
23 1 , 744 P.2d 231 , 236 ( 1987); Com
monwealth v. Brockington, 500 Pa. 2 16,
220, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (1983); State v.
Watson, 248 N.W.2d 398, 399 (S.D.
1976); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d

II

1 2 Crim. L . Rptr.(BNA) 2 1 33 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1 972).
12

Generally, the cases can be divided
into three groups. The first group
consists of those courts that adhere
to the traditional position, holding
polygraph evidence per se inadmissi
ble. A second group of courts admits
polygraph evidence upon stipulation.
Finally, a few courts entrust the ad
missibility of polygraph evidence to
the discretion of the trial court.

Jd. at 2 134.

13 See United States v. Hart, 344 F.
Supp. 522, 523-524 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
State v. Watson, 1 1 5 N.J. Super. 213,
2 1 8,278 A.2d 543,546(Hudson Cty. Ct.
1 971)(sentencing); Walterv. O'Connell,
72 Misc. 2d 3 1 6, 3 17, 339 N.Y.S.2d
386, 388 (Queens Civ. Ct. 1 972) (civil
case); In re Stenzel, 71 Misc. 2d 719,
336 N.Y. S.2d 839 (Niagara Cty. Fam.
Ct. 1972) (civil case).
14 United States v . Zeiger, 475 F.2d
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15
See generally Tarlow,''Admissibil
ity of Polygraph Evidence in 1 975: An
Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perju
ry-Plagued System," 26 Hastings L.J.
917 (1975); Note, "The Emergence of
the Polygraph at Trial," 73 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 120 ( 1973); Note, "Pinocchio's
New Nose," 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339
(1973).
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exclusionary mle extends to evidence
that a person was willing to take,
took, or refused to take an examina
8
tion. 1

A related issue concerns the extent

to which the widespread use of the
polygraph in law enforcement, secu
rity, and industrial activities may be
considered evidence of general ac
ceptance. Some courts accorded such
weight,24
considerable
evidence
while others ignored it.25
Still other courts reject Frye as the
appropriate standard for determining
the admissibility of scientific evi
dence but still exclude polygraph evi
dence.26 The U.S. Su reme Court
rejected Frye in 1993,2 but this does
not mean that the federal courts' ap
proach to polygraph evidence will
also change.
The principal �rgument against the
admissibility of poly raph evidence
is lack of reliability.2 Several points
are made on this score: the lack of
empirical validation/9 the numerous

Some courts rely on the Frye gen
eral acceptance test as the basis for
exclusion 1 9 but the application of this
test raises several issues. According
to Frye, psychology and physiology
are the fields in which general accep
tance must be achieved.20 Several de
cisions have expanded the ''field''
to include polygraph examiners.2 1 In
United States v. Alexander, 22 how
ever, the Eighth Circuit rejected this
view, saying that ''Experts in neurol
ogy, psychiatry and physiology may
offer needed enlightenment upon the
basic premises of polygraphy. Poly
graphists often lade extensive train
ing in these specialized sciences.' '23

�

f

206, 213 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1973): Rob
inson v. CorruYJ10ll\Vealt.ti," 231 v�·. 142,
156, 341 S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986); State
v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va.
1979); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228,
279, 307 N. W. 2d 628, 653 (1981).

24 E. g., United States v. Piccinonna,
885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989).
25 E.g., United States v. Alexander,
526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
26

E.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d
975, 979 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 297
Or. 404, 416-417, 687 P.2d 751, 759
(1984).

"E.g., United States v. Murray, 784
F.2d 188, 188-189 (6th Cir. 1986) (com
ment about polygraph deliberately intro
duced by experienced FBI agent was prej
udicial error). See generally Annotation,
"Propriety and Prejudicial Effect ofln
forrning Jury that Witness in Criminal
Prosecution Has Talcen Polygraph Test,''
15 A.L.R. 4th 824 (1982).

27

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma
ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
8
2

See United States v. Alexander, 526
F.2d 161, 166 (8t.l:i Cir. 1975) ("[W]e
are still unable to conclude that there
is sufficient scientific acceptability and
reliability to warrant the admission ofthe
results ofsuch tests in evidence''); People
v. Baynes, 88 lll. 2d 225, 239, 430
N. E.2d 1070, 1076 (1981) ("[T]he pri
mary obstacle in admission of polygraph
evidence, stipulated to or not, has contin
ually and consistently been the instru
ment's disputed scientific reliability").

19 E.g., Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298,
302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980); People
v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 377, 255
N. W.2d 171, 181 (1977).
2° Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
21

See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F.
Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C. ), rev'd, 475
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 1377,
1388 (S.D. Cal.), ajf'd, 470 F.2d 1367
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
907 (1973); United States v. Wilson, 361
F. Supp. 510,511 (D. Md. 1973).
22
23

29 See United States v. Wilson, 361 F.
Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) ("incipi
ent stage of experimental research");
People v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87,
96, 390 N.E.2d 562, 568 (1979) ("[T]he
estimate of the degree of accuracy of
polygraph tests seem[s] to come from
polygraph examiners themselves'').

526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
ld. at 164 n.6.
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that the trial will degenerate into a
time-consuming trial of the tech
niqueY

uncontrollable factors involved in the
exarnination,30 the subjective nature
of the deception deterrnination/1 and
the absence ofadequate standards for
assessing the qualifications of exam
iners. 32 Even if the reliability of the
technique is established, additional
problems are cited as reasons for ex
clusion, for example, the danger that
an opinion concerning the truthful
ness of a witness will intrude too
much into the jury's historic function
of assessing credibility33; the danger
that the jury will overvalue the ex
pert's testimony34; and the possibility

Admission Upon Stipulation
A substantial minority of courts
admit polygraph evidence upon stipu
lation of the parties. 36 For the most
part, this result has been achieved by
court decision,37 although statutory

to give almost conclusive weight to the
polygraph expert ' s opinion").
Whether juries will be overawed by
polygraph evidence is a matter of dispute.
See generally Cavoukian & Heslegrave,
"The Admissibility of Polygraph Evi
dence in Court: Some Empirical Find
ings," 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 1 7
( 1980); Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo,
' 'The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on
Jury Deliberations: An Empirical
Study, " 5 J. Police Sci. & Admin. 148
( 1977); Markwart& Lynch, "The Effect
of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury
Decision-Making," 7 J. Police Sci. &
Admin. 324 (1979).

30 See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d
354, 359 (Colo. 198 1 ) ("Several uncon
trollable or unascertainable physiological
and psychological responses may cause
difficulty or error. ").

3 1 People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354,
360 (Colo. 198 1) (The polygraph tech
nique, ''albeit based on a scientific theo
ry, remains an art with unusual responsi
bility placed on the examiner"); People
v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87, 98, 390
N.E.2d 562, 569 ( 1979) ("almost total
subjectiveness surrounding the use of the
polygraph and the interpretation of the
results").

35 See People v. Barbara, 400 Mich.
352, 410, 255 N.W.2d 1 7 1, 196 (1977)
("possibility of bogging down trials with
collateral matters, perhaps resulting in
a trial of the polygraph, or a battle of
experts"); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628,
643, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359-360 (1983)
(''possibility that the criminal proceeding
may degenerate into a trial of the poly
graph machine").

32 See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d
354, 360 (Colo. 198 1 ) ("The absence of
adequate qualification standards for the
polygraph profession heighten[s] the pos
sibility for grave abuse."); State v. Ca
tanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1979)
(lack of judicial and legislative control
over competence of examiners).

36 See generally Katz, "Dilemmas of
Polygraph Stipulations, " 14 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 285 ( 1984).

33 See People v. Baynes, 88 lll. 2d
225, 244, 430 N.E.2d 1070, 1079 ( 1981)
("A potential trial by polygraph is an
unwarranted intrusion into the jury func
tion."); State v. Davis, 407 So. 2d 702,
706 (La. 1 981) ("usurps the jury's pre
rogative on a question involving credi
bility").

37 E.g., United States v. Piccinonna,
885 F.2d 1 529, 1536 (1 1 th Cir. 1989);
Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 5 1 7,
5 1 9 (8th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Darcy,
783 F.2d 1 389, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); Ex
parte Clements, 447 So. 2d 695, 698
(Ala. 1 984); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz.
274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962);
Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 139,
594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v.
Chambers, 240 Ga. 76-77, 239 S.E.2d
324, 325 ( 1977); State v. Fain, 1 16 Idaho
82, 86, 774 P.2d 252, 256-257, cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 9 1 7 ( 1989); State v.
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586-587 (Iowa

34 See United States v. Alexander, 526
F.2d 1 6 1 , 1 68 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When
polygraph evidence is offered . . . , it is
likely to be shrouded with an aura of near
infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of
Delphi"); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d
975, 981 (La. 1979) ("trier of fact is apt
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hance the reliability of polygraph evi
dence, which is the principal reason
for exclusion. 40 According to some

provisions may accomplish the same
result. 33 At one time the trend toward
admissibility by stipulation appeared
so strong that it seemed only a matter

courts the answer to this objection

of time before it became the majority

is that admissibility does not derive
''from the fact that the stipulation

rule. Later decisions, however, cast

somehow imbues the evidence with

doubt on this possibility. Indeed, sev

reliability . . . but from the fact that
the parties are estopped, by their stip

eral courts that initially admitted
polygraph evidence upon stipulation

ulated waiver of the right to object,

have overruled their earlier decisions

from asserting the unacceptability of
the evidence.' '41 Other courts that

and now hold polygraph evidence per
se inadmissible.39

accept stipulated results recognize, at

Courts rejecting the admissibility

least i.mplicitly, that the technique

of stipulated exaiu.inations argue that

possesses some degree of validity

the stipulation does nothing to en-

at least when the results are admitted
under controlled conditions designed
both to ensure thai the examination is

1980); Corbett v. State, 584 P.2d 704,
707 (Nev. 1978); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio
St. 2d 123, 133-134, 372 N.E.2d 1318,
1323-1324 (1978); State v. Rebeterano,
681 P.2d 1265, 1268-1269 (Utah 1984).
See generally Annotation, "Admissi
bility of Lie Detector Test Taken Upon
Stipulation That the Results WilllBe Ad
missible k'1 Evidence," 53 A.L.R.3d
1005 (1973).

properly administered by a compe
tent examiner and to limit the purpose
of

admissibility. 42

Finally,

some

40 See Pulalr,is v. State, 476 P.2d 474,
479 (Alaska 1970); State v. Grier, 307
N.C. 628, 642, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359
(1983); Com;nonwealth v. lBroclcington,
500 Pa. 216, 220, 455 A.2d 627, 629
(1983).
See also People v. Monigan, 72 lll.
App. 3d 87, 88, 390 N.E.2d 562, 563
(1979) (stipulation rejected as contrary to
public policy and as an invalid stipulation
of law).
41 Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299

'' See Cal. Evid. Code § 351.1 ('west
Supp. 1992): "Notwithstanding any oth
er provision of law, the results of a poly
graph examination, the opinion of a poly
graph examiner, or any reference to an
offer to talce, failure to take, or taking of
a polygraph examination, shall not be
admitted into evidence in any criminal
proceeding . . . unless all parties stipulate
to the admission of such results." See
also People v. Kegler, 197 Cal. App. 3d
72, 90, 242 Cal. Rptr. 897, 909 (1987)
(stipulation statute does not violate defen
dant's constitutional rights).

(Ala. Crim. App. 1982). Accord State v.
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586-587 (Iowa
1980) (estoppel); State v. Rebeterano,
681 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1984) (es
toppel).
42 E.g., United States v. Oliver, 525
F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975) ("We
believe the necessary foundation can be
constructed through testimony showing a
sufficient degree of acceptance of the
science of polygraphy by experienced
practitioners in polygraphy and other re
lated experts"), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
973 (1976); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz.
274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962)
(polygraphy "has been developed to a
state in which its results are probative
enough to warra.T!t ad...rnissibi!ity upon
stipulation").

39

See State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628,
645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 356-361 (1983),
overruling State v. Milano, 297 N.C.
485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979); Fulton v.
State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1975), overruling Castleberry v.
State, 522 P.2d 257 (Olda. Crirn. App.
1974), and Jones v. State, 527 P.2d 169
(Olda. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Dean,
103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 N.W.2d 628,
653 (1981), overruling State v. Stanis
lawslci, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8
(1974).
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courts justify admission on a combi
nation of these grounds.43
The legal theory recognized for
admission of stipulated results may
be critical. The waiver or estoppel
theory could permit the prosecution
to introduce polygraph results in its
case-in-chief unless the stipulation
limits admissibility to impeachment.
In contrast, courts permitting admis
sion of stipulated results under con
trolled conditions typically limit ad
missibility to credibility, with the
result that the evidence is admissible
only if the defendant testifies.
Conditions for Admission

The leading case on admissibility
by stipulation is State v. Valdez, 44 in
which the Arizona Supreme Court
held that stipulated polygraph results
are admissible if the following condi
tions are met:
(1) That the county attorney, de
fendant and his counsel all sign a
written stipulation providing for de
fendant's submission to the test and
for the subsequent admission at trial
of the graphs and the examiner's
opinion thereon on behalf of either
defendant or the state.
(2) That notwithstanding the stip
ulation the admissibility of the test
results is subject to the discretion of
the trial judge, i.e., if the trial judge
is not convinced that the examiner is
qualified or that the test was conduct
ed under proper conditions he may
refuse to accept such evidence.
(3) That if the graphs and examin
er's opinion are offered in evidence
the opposing party shall have the right
to cross-examine the examiner re
specting:

c.

the limitations of and possibili
ties for error in the technique of
polygraphic interrogation; and

d. at the discretion of the trial
judge, any other matter deemed
pertinent to the inquiry.
(4) That if such evidence is admit
ted the trial judge should instruct the
jury that the examiner's testimony
does not tend to prove or disprove
any element of the crime with which
a defendant is charged but at most
tends only to indicate that at the time
of the examination defendant was not
telling the truth. Further, the jury
members should be instructed that it
is for them to determine what corrob
orative weight and effect such testi
mony should be given.45
The Valdez conditions have been
adopted by many of the courts that
admit stipulated polygraph results.46
Several courts have altered the condi
tions. For example, an oral agree
ment in open court in lieu of a written
agreement is recognized by some
courts.47 In addition, a warning that
the defendant is waiving the right
against self-incrimination may also
be required.48
Interpretation of Stipulation

The interpretation of stipulations
has raised a number of issues, 49 and
45

/d. at 283-284, 371 P.2d at 900-

901.
.u; E.g., Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d
294, 300 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State
v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 1 34, 372
N.E.2d 1 3 1 8, 1 323 (1978).
47 See Wynn v. State, 42 3 So. 2d 294,
299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v.
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 587 (Iowa
1980).

a. the examiner's qualifications
and training;

8
4 See Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294,
299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

43 See State v. Renfro, 96 Wash. 2d
902, 906-907, 639 P.2d 737, 739, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 842 ( 1982).
44

b. the conditions under which the
test was administered;

49 E.g., Young v. State, 387 So. 2d
5 12-5 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (ex-

91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

the cases highlight the imporumce of
drafting the stipulation with care. For

In People v. Reeder'4 the court
held that a defense counsel ''who, in
advance of the examination, stipu
lates that a defendant will submit to a
polygraph examination and the re
sults will be admissible at trial dem
onstrates incompetence.' '55 This de
cision was subsequently vacated and
the defendant's incompetency claiiu

example, an agreement to admit the
results of a polygraph examination
conducted by a competent examiner
does not encompass an examination
by an examiner who is not licensed
under the applicable state statute. 50
An agreement to admit the results of

an examination permits the prosecu
tion to use the results in its case

rejected. 56 Later cases also reject such
claims. For example, in one case the
court held that when counsel agrees

in-chief in the absence of a state
ment limiting the results to impeach
ment. 51

to an examination after the defendant
insists on his innocence, there is no

Moreover, some courts have held

incompetence. 57

that the agreement must be strictly

In

construed; thus, when the state failed

tion reduced to writing and then failed
to raise the issue at trial after tl-Je

were inadmissible. 52 The argument
for construing a stipulation strictly

prosecutor reneged on ihe agreement.

agaii1St the state is based on constitu
tional grounds: ''Where an accused

Discretionary Admission

waives his constitutional right to re

A few courts recognize a trial
court's discretion to admit polygraph
evidence even in the absence of a
stipulation. 59 The Seventh Circuit has

main silent in exchange for an agree
ment that his statements will not be
used under certain conditions which
are fulfilled, the bargain made by the
State will be enforced. "53

perts in addition to examiner not permit
ted to testify because their testimony was

54

129 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976).

55

ld. at 648.

56

People v. Reeder, 65 Cal. App. 3d

235, 135 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1976).

not part of the stipulation); Porterfield v.
State, 150 Ga. App. 303, 257 S. E.2d
372, 373 (1979) (testimony concerning

57 People v. Berry, 118 Cal. App. 3d
122, 134, 173 Cal. Rptr. 137, 143, cert.

denied, 454 U. S. 966 (1981). See also

inconclusive results not admissible be

State v. Sloan, 226 N.J. Super. 605,

cause not part of the stipulation).

612-614, 545 A.2d 230, 233-234 (A.D.
1988); Annotation, "Adequacy of De

Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138,

140, 594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v.

fense Counsel's Representation of Crimi

Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 115, 118, 555

nal Client Regarding Hypnosis and Truth

P . 2d 481,482 (1976).

Tests," 9 A.L.R. 4th 354 (1981).

51 White v. State, 269 Ind. 479, 483484, 381 N.E.2d 481, 484-485 (1978);

50

982 F.2d 1246, 1251-1252 (8th

Cir. 1993).

State v. Baskerville, 139 N.J. Super. 389,

59

394,354 A.2d 328, 330 (1976).

The following trial courts have ad

mitted polygraph evidence at a criminal

Chambers v. State, 146 Ga. App.

trial without a stipulation. United States

126, 128,245 S.E.2d 467,469 (1978).
53

the

attorney failed to have an oral stipula

all questions, the examination results

52

v.. Lockharf8

sistance of counsel where the defense

quired the defense attorney to review

50

Houston

Eighth Circuit fou·nd ineffective as

to comply with a stipulation that re

v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); People v. Daflie!s, 422

State v. Fuller, 387 So. 2d 1040,

1041-1042 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980).

N.Y.S.2d 832,837 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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adopted this approach. 60 In most cas
es, however, trial courts exercise this
discretion by excluding polygraph
evidence.
The leading federal case is United
States v. Piccinonna, 61 in which the
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en bane,
ruled that polygraph evidence was
admissible under certain circum
stances, even in the absence of a
stipulation. The court based its deci
sion on a number of factors:
Since the Frye decision, tremen
dous advances have been made in
polygraph instrumentation and
technique. Better equipment is be
ing used by more adequately
trained polygraph administrators.
Further, polygraph tests are used
extensively by government agen
cies. Field investigative agencies
such as the FBI, the Secret Service,
military intelligence and law en
forcement agencies use the poly
graph. Thus, even under a strict
adherence to the traditional Frye
standard, we believe it is no longer
accurate to state categorically that
polygraph testing lacks general ac
ceptance for use in all circum
stances.62
The court went on to specify sever
al conditions for admissibility. Poly
graph evidence is admissible to im
peach or corroborate the testimony of
a witness if (1) adequate notice is
provided; (2) the opposing side has
the opportunity to conduct its own
test; and (3) the requirements of the
Federal Rules of Evidence are satis
fied-for example, corroboration is
permissible only after impeachment.

63
United States v. Piccinonna,729 F.
Supp. 1 336 (D.C. Fla. 1990).

60 E.g.,United States v. Dietrich,854
F.2d 1 056, 1 059 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 1 36, 141 (7th
Cir. 1985), cerl. denied, 478 U.S. 1022
(1986).
61
62

Even if all three conditions are met,
the decision on admissibility is en
trusted to the discretion of the trial
court. The trial court may reject the
evidence because the examiner was
not qualified, the test was poorly ad
ministered, or the questions were im
proper. On remand, the trial court
excluded the evidence because the
questions and answers were irrele
vant, and any probative value was
outweighed by the danger of mis
leading the jury.63
Of the state jurisdictions, New
Mexico has gone the furthest in ad
mitting polygraph evidence. In State
v. Dorsey64 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that polygraph results
were admissible if (1) the operator is
qualified; (2) the testing procedures
were reliable; and (3) the test of the
particular subject was valid.65 Cur
rently, New Mexico Evidence Rule
707 governs admissibility. This rule
permits the admissibility of poly
graph evidence in the discretion of
the trial court under the following
conditions. First, the examination
must be conducted by a qualified ex
aminer. Minimum qualifications in
clude five years' experience adminis
tering or interpreting examinations or
equivalent academic training and at
least twenty hours of continuing edu
cation during the twelve months prior
to the examination offered in evi
dence. 66 Second, the examination
must include at least two relevant
questions, at least three charts, and
be quantitatively scored. 67 Moreover,
the pretest interview and actual test
ing must be recorded on an audio or
video recording device. 68 Third, the

64

88 N.M. 1 84,539 P.2d 204 ( 1 975).

65

!d. at 184- 1 85,539 P.2d at 205.

66

N.M. Evid. R. 707(b).

885 F.2d 1 529 (1 1th Cir. 1989).

67

N.M. Evid. R. 707(c).

ld. at 1 532.

68

N.M. Evid. R. 707(e).
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party intending to offer the evidence
generally must provide thirty-day
written notice to the other party,
including copies of the examii1er's
report, each chart, the audio or video
recording of the pretest interview and
actual testing, and a list of any prior

graph exmni11er, or any reference to
an offer to take, failure to take, or
talcii!g of a polygraph examination,
shall not be admitted into evi
dence. "75

examinations taken by the subject. 69

Several constitutional arguments
have been advanced to support the
admissibility of polygraph evidence.

Constitutional Arguments

At one time Massachusetts also
admitted polygraph evidence without
stipulation. In Commonwealth v. A
Ju-venile (1974f0 the Supreme Judi
cial Court of Massachusetts held
polygraph evidence admissible if the

First, defendants have argued that
the constitutional right to present a
defense includes the right to intro
duce favorable polygraph results.

defendant agreed i.n advance to the
admission of test results and the trial

Second, defendants also have argued
for a constitutional right to impeach

judge conducted a ''close and search

prosecution witnesses if these wit
nesses have failed government-ad
ministered ex�nations.

ing inquiry'' into the qualifications
of the examii1er, the methods em
ployed in the examination, and the
suitability of the defendant for test

Right to Present a Def ense

abruptly abandoned the position it

The most common argument fo
cuses on an accused's right to present

ing. 7 1 In 1989, however, the court

had adopted in .c4 Juvenile

an

d r.Jled

State v. Dorsey77 a
New Mexico appellate court reversed
a trial court's exclusion of polygraph
evidence, holding that a defendant
has a due process right to present
critical and reliable defense evidence.
In Jackson v. Garrison78 a federal
district court held that the exclusion
of polygraph evidence denied a de
fendant a fair trial. In State v. Sims79
an Ohio trial court found an implied
right to present defense evidence in
the compulsory process guarantee
that, it concluded, compelled the ada defense.76 In

polygraph evidence inadmissible in
criminal trials.72 According to the
court, the ''failure of the basic theory
of polygraphy to have gained general
acceptance among physiological and
psychological authorities' m required
it to reevaluate its position.
In 1987 the Court of Military Ap
peals ruled that polygraph evidence

was admissible in the discretion of
the trial judge.74 In 1991, however,
Military Ru1e of Evidence 707(a) ab
mgated this decision. The rule reads:
"Notwithstanding any other provi
sion of law, the results of a polygraph

75 Mil. R. Evid. 707.

examination, the opinion of a poly-

69

N.M. Evid. R. 707(d).

70

365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120

76 See generally Clinton, ''The Right
to Present a Defense: An Emergent Con
stitutional Guarantee in Criminal Tri
als," 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713, 810-815
(1976).

(1974).
71

77 87 N.M. 323, 532 P. 2d 912, 914915 (N.M. App.),aff'd on other grounds,

!d. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124.

72 Conunonwealth v. Mendes, 406

88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975).

Mass. 201,547 N. E.2d 35 (1989).

78 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979),
rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981).

73 /d. at 201, 547 N.E.2d at 35-36.

79 52 Ohio Misc.
'1 A At:.. f1"1 D 1 0'7'7\
�i,iV\V.Jl , �711)•

" United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J.
246, 253-254 (C.M.;�,. 1987).
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nusswn of defense polygraph evi
dence. The precedential value of
these cases, however, is not strong.
Jackson was overruled on appeal,80
Dorsey was affirmed but not on con
stitutional grounds,81 and Sims is in
2
consistent with later Ohio cases.8
The right to present defense evi
dence also was cited in McMorris
v. Israel, 83 in which the defendant
offered to stipulate to the admission
of a polygraph examination. Al

deprived the defendant of due pro
cess: "From all that appears, [the
prosecutor] was acting solely for tac
tical reasons in the belief that a test
would not be helpful to his case.
If the prosecutor refuses and states
reasons, it then becomes the duty of
the court to determine whether the

reasons offered rise above the purely
tactical considerations present in a
" 6
given case. 8

The response to McMorris has
been chilly. Chief Justice Rehnquist

though stipulated polygraph results
were admissible under state law at
that time,84 the prosecutor, without

characterized McMorris as a "dubi
ous constitutional holding.' '87 Some

offering any reasons, refused to stipu

courts simply reject the argument that
the prosecution is required to provide

late. In granting habeas corpus relief,

the Seventh Circuit wrote: ''Where
credibility is as critical as in the in
stant case, the circumstances are such
as to make the polygraph evidence

reasons for its refusal to stipulate.88
Other courts reject the broader propo

materially

Moreover, the Seventh C ircuit itself
has noted that McMorris applies only
where a jurisdiction accepts stipulat
ed polygraph results90 and does not
change a trial court's discretionary
authority to exclude polygraph evi
dence.91

exculpatory

within

sition that there is a constitutional
right to present polygraph evidence. 89

the

meaning of the C onstitution. "85 The
court, however, rested its decision on
narrower grounds; that is, the prose
cution's refusal to stipulate without
offering a valid ground for the refusal
80 Jackson v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 371
(4th Cir. 1 981).

86 !d. at 466.

81

87 Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967,
970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).

State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 1 84, 539
P.2d 204 (1975).
82
Although the Ohio Supreme Court
accepted the admission of stipulated poly
graph results in State v. Souel, 53 Ohio
St. 2d 123, 132, 372 N.E.2d 1 3 1 8, 1 323
(1978), it rejected the constitutional argu
ments for admission in State v. Levert,
58 Ohio St. 2d 2 1 3, 215, 389 N.E.2d
848, 850 (1979).
8
3

88

See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d 835,
838 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 982).
89 E.g., Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d
1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1 984); United States
v. Gordon, 688 F.2d 42, 44 (8th Cir.
1982); Milano v. Garrison, 677 F.2d
374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); Jackson v.
Garrison, 677 F.2d 37 1 , 373 (4th Cir.
1 98 1 ); United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d
857, 867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
u.s. 860 ( 1979).

643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982).
84 At the time McMorris was tried,
Wisconsin admitted stipulated polygraph
results. After the Seventh Circuit deci
sion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court over
ruled its prior decision and held poly
graph evidence per se inadmissible. State
v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307
N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981).

90 United States v. Black, 684 F.2d
481, 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
u.s. 1 043 (1982).
9 1 United States v. Feldman, 7 1 1 F.2d
758, 767 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 464
U.S. 939 ( 1983); United States v. Lupo,
652 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 1981), cen.
denied, 457 U.S. 1 1 35 (1982).

1!5 McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458,
462 (7t.h Cir. 1 98 1 ).
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liable to conduct an examination, it
had the burden, according to the
court, of explaining why the test re
sults should be excluded at trial.
Subsequent cases, however, have
generally rejected this reasoning.98
For example, in United States v. Mac
Entee, 99 the courfcommented:

Impeachment ofProsecution
Witnesses

In United States v. A&S Council
Oil Co. 92 the defendant sought "a

Confrontation Clause exception to
the general inadmissibility of poly
graph results to accommodate an ac
cused's attacks on ihe credibility of
key government witnesses. " 93 The
prosecution witness had entered into

The Hal1 court makes an incorrect
logical leap. Brady . . . stands for
the principal [sic] that the constitu
tion requires the government to
turn over exculpatory information
to the defense. Once the govern
ment turns over such information,
however, the question of whether
it may be introduced at trial is
governed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence, not by Brady.100

a plea agreement with the govern

ment that required the witness to take

a polygraph examination if requested
by the prosecution. The witness also
agreed that the results were admissi
ble against llli-n in a court of law. The

witness thereafter failed two poly

graph examinations. The defense
sought to introduce these examina

Proceedings Other 17wn Trial

tions as impeachment evidence. Al
though the Fourth Circuit aclrnowl

Courts have admitted! polygraph
evidence at suppression hearings, 1 01
1
sentenci11g heartiigs, 02 motions for
new trial proceedings, 1 03 and prison

edged that the facts of the case were
"compelling, " it felt bound by its
prior decisions mat had excluded
olygraph results.94 Accordingly, the
court rejected £L.'1 ''exculpatory use''
exception for polygraph evidence.
A sii!lilar issue was raised in Unit
ed States v. Han, 95 in which the court
ruled that a prosecution witness's
polygraph results, which indicated
deception, were admissible under
Brady v. Mmyland.96 The court inter
preted Brady as requiring the disclo
sure of "any evidence which may
tend to exculpate a defendant.' '97
initially
prosecution
the
Since
thought the polygraph sufficiently re-

p

9'

98 E.g., Peopie v. Price, 1 CaL 4th
324, 419, 321 P.2d 610, 663, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 106,159 (1991); State v. Waff,373
N.W.2d 18,25 (S.D. 1985); Robinson v.
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 156, 341
S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986); State v. Young,
89 Wash. 2d 613, 622-623, 574 P.2d
1171, 1177, cnt. denied, 439 U.S. 870
(1973).
99 713 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
100

Peoole v. Cutter. 12 Crim. L. Reo.
(BNA) 2 i 33 (Cal. S�per. Ct. Nov. 6,
1972); People v. McKim1ey, 137 Mich.
App. 110, 115, 357 N.W.2d 825, 828
(1984).

947 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991).

93 !d. at 1133.

102

State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546,551,
521 P.2d 978, 983, celt. denied, 419
U.S. 1004 (1974); State v. Watson, 115
N.J. Super. 213,218,278 A.2d 543,546
(1971).

94 "The

broad exception Council
seeks to create for an accused's attacks
on government witnesses would . . .
conflict with [our] precedents." !d. at
1134.
95

344F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

96

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

!d. at 831.

101

103
State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975,
982-983 (La. 1979); People v. Barbara,
400 Mich. 352, 412-414, 255 N.W.2d
171, 197-199 (1977); People v. Snell,
118 Mich. App. 750, 768, 325 N.W.2d

97

United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp.
522,523 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

C:C'"J t::.'/'1 /1 ()0,.,\
JUJ, J/.L �!70L.J.
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disciplinary hearings.104 They have
also ruled that polygraph evidence
may be considered in determining
probable cause.1 05
Some of these courts distinguish
such proceedings from the trial itself.
For example, the Michigan Supreme
Court has held polygraph evidence
admissible on a motion for a new
trial, although the same evidence is
inadmissible at trial.106 According to
the court, polygraph results may be
of some assistance to the trial judge
in deciding issues that typically arise

Fifth

Amendment's

prohibition

against compelled self-incrimination:
Some tests seemingly directed to
obtain ''physical evidence,'' for
example, lie detector tests measur
ing changes in body function dur
ing iilterrogation, may actually be
directed

to

eliciting

responses

which are essentially testimonial.
To compel a person to submit to
testing in which an effort will be
made to determine his guilt or in
nocence on the basis of physiologi

in proceedings to determine whether

cal responses, whether willed or

a new trial should be granted: ''Tradi

not, is to evoke the spirit and histo
ry of the Fifth Amendment.110

tionally, the testimony of recanting
or suddenly discovered witnesses has
been highly suspect, largely because

The courts that have admitted poly

it is impossible to determine when the
truth is being told. The polygraph

graph evidence have recognized the

won't do this either; not even its most
ardent proponents would so contend.
But it might help. " 1 07 The court also
commented that admissibility in this
context would provide an ''opportu
nity to test [the] effectiveness of the
8
polygraph. "10

context: ''The polygraph results are

applicabiity of the privilege in this
essentially testimonial in nature and
therefore a defendant could not be
compelled initially to take such an
exanlination on the Commonwealth's
motion."111 The protection of the
privilege also extends to any com
ment by the prosecution that a defen

Fifth Amendment

dant had refused to submit to an
2
exanlination.11 The defendant, how

In Schmerber v. Califomia1 09 the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated, albeit
in dictum, that compelled submission
to a polygraph test would violate the

ever, may waive the privilege.113

110

104

Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365
Mass. 42 1 , 43 1, 3 13 N.E.2d 120, 1 27
(1974).
1

12 See Bowen v. Eyman,324 F. Supp.
339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970); MacDonald v.
State, 1 64 Ind. App. 285,293-294, 328
N.E.2d 436,441 ( 1975).

105

Bennett v. Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d
400, 405-406 (5th Cir. 1989); State v.
Coffey,309 Or. 342,345-347,788 P.2d
424, 425-427 (1990); State v. Cherry,
61 Wash. App. 301 , 8 1 0 P.2d 990,942943 ( 1 99 1 ).

113
See Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 761
F.2d 558, 562 (lOth Cir. 1 985) (agree
ment to stipulate to admission of poly
graph results was not a valid waiver of
privilege against self-incrimination);
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 73 1,
734-736 (8th Cir. 1975), cen. denied,
424 U.S. 973 (1976) ; United States v .
Ridling,350 F. Supp. 90,97 (E.D. Mich.
1972).

106

People v. Barbara,400 Mich. 352,
41 1 -4 1 4, 255 N.W.2d 171, 1 97- 198
(1977).
107

Jd. at 415,255 N.W.2d at 1 99.

JOB

Jd.

10
9

384 u.s. 757 ( 1966).

/ d. at 764.

111

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d
800, 803 (9th Cir . ), cen. denied, 1 12 S.
Ct. 2 1 3 ( 1990); Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d
1 1 71, 1 174 (7th Cir. 1 989).
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nation.119 fu Wyrick v. Fields120 the
Supreme Court held that statements
made by a defendant during a post
test interview were admissible where
the defendant, who was represented
by counsel, requested a polygraph
examination and was informed of his
Miranda rights. The Court rejected
the argument that new warnings were
required prior to the post-test inter
view. However, not all statements
that are made after an examination
are necessarily admissible; they are
admissible only if the defendant vol
untarily and lmowingly waives his
rights to remain silent and to
1
counsel.12
In addition to Fifth Amendment
Miranda rights; a defendant's admis
sions during a polygraph examination
may be excluded from evidence if
they are obtained in violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel1 22

Confessions
It is not uncommon for a defendant

to make an incriminatory statement
before, during, or after a polygraph
examination. Since polygraph exami
nations involve testimonial evidence
under the Fifb'1 Amendment privi
lege, the admissibility of statements
made during the examination process
often are subject to Miranda warn
1
ings. 14lvliranda warnings, however,
are required only if the defendant is
116
A
in custodyi15 and is interrogated.
person who is not under arrest and
who voluntarily agrees to take th�
11
examination is not "in custody. " 7
Moreover, the defendant may waive
his right to remain silent and to coun
sel when he agrees to take a polygraph
1 8
examination. 1
Even if the defendant initially as
serts his right to counsel after receiv

or are involuntary under t.he due pro

1
cess clause. 23 rv1oreover, some
courts have held that polygraph evi
dence is admissible for the limited
purpose of showing the voluntariness
of a confession.124

ing Miranda warnings, he may subse
quently waive that right by initiating
conversations with the police, includ
ing a request for a polygraph exami-

119
See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039 (1983).

114

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See also United States v. Little
Bear, 583 F. 2d 41 I, 414 (8th Cir. 1978)
(tailoring Miranda warnings for poly
graph ex<uninations).

120

See United States v. Gill yard, 726
F.2d 1426, 1429-1430 (9th Cir. 1984)
(defendant did not validly waive right to
a post-test interrogation by officers other

1
' 5 See Berlcemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984).
116

459 U.S. 42 (1982).

121

than the examiner).

SeeP'-hodeisland v. Initis, 446 U.S.

122

291 (1980).
117 See Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329,

See Barrera v. Young, 794 F. 2d

1264, 1271-1272 (7th Cir. 1986) (right
to counsel waived); Fields v. Wyrick,

334-335 (8th Cir. ) (defendant not in cus
tody at time incriminating statements

706 F.2d 879, 880-881 (8th Cir. 1983)

made in response to examiner's statement

(same).

that defendant had shown deception on
polygraph test), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.

123 See Barrera v. Young, 794 F.2d
1264, 1271-1272 (7th Cir. 1986) (con

81 (1993).
113

fession during polygraph exam not invol
untary). See generally Annotation, "Ad

See United States v. Iron Thunder,

Henry v. Dees, 658 F. 2d 406, 408 (5th

missibility in Evidence of Confession
Made by Accused in Anticipation of,

Cir. 1981) (waiver invalid where examin

During, or Following Polygraph Exami

er asked questions of a mentally retarded

nation," 89 A.L.R. 3d 230 (1979).

defendant that went beyond agreement to
take examination).

F. 2d 1233, 1244-1245 (7th Cir. 1979),

714 F.2d 765, 771-772 (8th Cir. 1983);

124
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Pretrial Agreements

In a few reported cases prosecutors
have gone beyond stipulating to the
admissibility of test results and have
agreed to dismiss the charges if the
defendant passes a polygraph exami-.
nation . 1 25 In some cases the defendant
had no obligations under such an
agreement other than to cooperate in
6
the examination. 1 2 In other cases the
defendant either agreed to admit the
test results127 or to enter a plea to a
reduced charge 1 28 in the event he
failed the examination.

A determinative factor in the re
ported cases has been the existence

' 'pledge of public faith-a promise
made by state officials-and one that
0
should not be lightly disregarded. ' ' 13
On the other hand, when court ap

proval was required but not obtained,

prosecution has been permitted even

though a defendant successfully
passed the examination. 131

Notwithstanding the lack of court

approval, enforcement of such an
agreement may be required on consti
tutional grounds . In agreeing to take

a polygraph examination, the defen
dant waives his Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination.

It seems questionable that the state
could induce such a waiver by prom

of a statute requiring court approval
for dismissals. When a trial court
approved the dismissal or was aware

ising to dismiss the charges in the
event the defendant passes the exarni
�ation and then renege on that prom

of the agreement, appellate courts

Ise after the defendant has waived his
constitutional rights. 132 The illinois
Supreme Court cited the defendant' s

have held the prosecutor bound by
the agreement on public policy
grounds. 1 29 According
to
t.hese

waiver o f the privilege i n ruling that
the state must abide by its agreement

courts, the agreement represents a

to dismiss if the defendant passes a

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); Anno

polygraph test. 133 Similarly, a Penn
sylvania appellate court enforced an
agreement between a police officer
and the defendant, which required the

tation, ' 'Admissibility of Polygraph Evi
dence at Trial on Issue of Voluntariness
of Confession Made by Accused, " 92
A.L.R. 3d 1317 ( 1 979).

125
See generally Annotation, "En
forceability of Agreement by State Offi
cials to Drop Prosecution if Accused Suc
cessfully Passes Polygraph Test,' ' 36
A.L.R. 3d 1280 ( 1 97 1).

dismissal of charges if the defendant
passed a polygraph test. 134 The court
rejected the argument that the officer
130
State v. Davis, 1 88 So. 2d 24, 27
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 966).

126

See People v. Reagan, 395 Mich.
306, 309, 235 N.W.2d 581, 583 ( 1975);
State v. Sanchell , 1 9 1 Neb. 505, 509510, 2 1 6 N.W.2d 504, 507-508 (1974)
(agreement not binding without court ap
proval), cert. denied, 420 U. S . 909
(1975).

131
State v. Sanchell, 1 9 1 Neb. 505 ,
5 10, 2 1 6 N.W.2d 504, 508 ( 1 974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). See also
Snead v. State, 415 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1 982) (oral agreement
y.'ith sheriff who lacked authority to enter
mto such an agreement is not enforce
able).

127
See Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 ,
424-425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 969).
128
See State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24,
27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 966).

132

Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S . �57 (1971) (enforceability of plea
bargam).

129
Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 ,
. 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v.
Davis, 1 88 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966) ; People v. Reagan, 395
Mich. 306, 3 1 8, 235 N.W.2d 5 8 1 , 587
(1975) .

133
People v. Stark, 1 06 lll.2d 44 1 ,
452, 478 N.E.2d 350, 355-356 (1985).
134
Commonwealth v. Scuilli
'
A.2d 620 (Pa. Super. 1993).
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courts reached diametrically opposed
views on the reliability of polygraph
evidence, both basing their respective
opinions on ' 'recent scientific re
search. " In fact, neither court cited
the most recent and comprehensive
research on the subject .

did not have the authority to make
such an agreement. ' 'Fundamental
fairness ' ' 135 required the Common
wealth to abide by its commitments.

Conclusion
This two-part article on polygraph
evidence began with a discussion of

These cases illustrate t\vo distinct
problems. First, notwithstanding the
polygraph ' s long history, the best re

two 1989 polygraph cases: United
States v. Piccinonna1 36 and Common

wealth v. Mendes. 1 37 In Piccinonna

the Eleventh Circuit ruled polygraph
evidence admissible based in part on
' 'new empirical evidence and schol
arly opinion which have undercut
many of the traditional arguments .
against admission of polygraph evi
dence. " 1 38 In Mendes, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts
abruptly rejected its earlier landmark
decision admitting polygraph evi
dence. According to the court, exclu
sion \Vas compelled owL.1.g to "tl1e
:failure of the basic theory of poly
graphy to have gained general accep
tance among physiological and psy
chological

authorities. ' ' 139

test in Daube11 v. Merrell Dow Phar
4
maceuticals, Inc. , 1 1 will not make
L�ings any easier. Indeed, Daubert
places .even greater responsibility on
the judiciary .

These

1"10

Barland, "The Polygraph Test in
the USA and Elsewhere , ' ' in The Poly
graph Test: Lies, Tmth and Science 76
(A. Gale ed. 1988). See also Department
of Defense, ' 'The Accuracy and Utility
of Polygraph Testing," reprinted in 1 3
Polygraph 1 ,58 (1984) (there ' 'has been
more scientific research conducted on lie
detection in the last six years than in the

885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).

137

406 Mass. 201, 547 N . E . 2d 35
(1989).
130

ground truth of the laboratory with
140
the realism of field applications . ' '
Second, courts encounter substan
tial problems when dealing with sci
entific evidence. The U.S. Supreme
Court's recent rejection of the F1J7e

135
!d. at 625 (citing the doctrine of
equitable immunity).
136

search has onJy recently been report
ed. One researcher noted in 1988 that
" [o]nly now are superior paradigms
being developed which combine the

885 F . 2 d at 1533.

139

previous 60 years").

406 Mass. at 201, 547 N. E.2d at
35-36.

141
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1 1 3 S . Ct. 2786 (1993).

